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The Rivalry Between Truth and Privilege:
The Weakness of the Supreme Court's
Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996)
by
EDWARD IMWINKELRIED*
The title of this conference is Truth and Its Rivals. This segment
of the conference is devoted to privilege law. Two questions natu-
rally arise in this context: Is there a rivalry between the pursuit of
truth and the promotion of the policies inspiring privilege law? If so,
which value should prevail? The purpose of this short Article is to
use the Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee v. Redmond' as a vehicle
for exploring these two questions.
I. A Description of the Jaffee Litigation
Jaffee was a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. section
1983.2 The plaintiffs were the heirs of Ricky Allen, Sr. Allen had
been shot to death by Mary Lu Redmond, a police officer in the em-
ploy of the Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois. The heirs alleged
that Redmond had used excessive force during an encounter with
Allen. The heirs named both Redmond and the village as defen-
dants
During pretrial discovery in the district court, the plaintiffs
learned that following the shooting, Redmond had consulted a li-
censed clinical social worker.4 The plaintiffs claimed that they
needed to review the social worker's notes in order to prepare to
cross-examine Redmond at trial. The defendants opposed the dis-
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
1. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
2. See id. at 5.
3. See id. at 4.
4. See iL at 5.
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covery; they contended that there is a psychotherapist privilege under
Rule 501' of the Federal Rules of Evidence.6
The district court judge rejected the defendants' privilege claim.'
Nevertheless, the defendants refused to answer questions relating to
the consultations during depositions and at trial. The judge informed
the jury that they could draw an adverse inference from the defen-
dants' refusal to comply with the plaintiffs' discovery request.8 The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and awarded damages ex-
ceeding half a million dollars.'
A. The Seventh Circuit Decision
The defendants initially appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Unlike the district court, the Sev-
enth Circuit sustained the defendants' privilege claim."
On the threshold question of whether there is a federal psycho-
therapist privilege, the Seventh Circuit decided that "reason and ex-
perience compel the recognition" of such a testimonial privilege."
The court advanced two distinct rationales for doing so.
One rationale was humanistic in nature. Humanistic or intrinsic
rationales "treat privileges as corollaries to the rights to privacy and
personal autonomy."'2 The court declared that there are "zones of
privacy" protecting "personal autonomy."' 3 The court emphasized
that in "the American legal tradition," the protection of privacy is a
5. FED. R. EvID. 501. The rule reads in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience.
Id.
6. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 6.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 5. The judge told that jury that the defendant's refusal to turn over the
notes had "no legal justification" and that the jurors could therefore presume that the
contents of the notes were unfavorable to the defendants. Id at 5-6.
9. See id. at 6.
10. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995). affd. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
11. Id. at 1355-56.
12. Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal Rule
of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Syn-
thesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 511, 543-44 (1994).
13. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1356.
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legitimate "end in itself."14
The court also developed an instrumental rationale for creating a
psychotherapist privilege. An instrumental justification "argue[s]
that privileges should be recognized as a means to the end of pro-
moting certain types of out-of-court conduct such as candid consulta-
tions between patients and their" psychotherapists. 5 The court ob-
served that during counseling sessions, a patient frequently divulges
"highly personal matters," the public disclosure of which
"would ... be embarrassing to the point of mortification .... '16 The
court feared that without an "assurance" of confidentiality, a patient
would be reluctant to reveal "his innermost thoughts." 7 Further, the
court was concerned that a psychotherapist could not effectively di-
agnose and treat a patient without such revelations.
Although these rationales persuaded the court to fashion a psy-
chotherapist privilege, the court appreciated that the privilege could
obstruct the search for truth. 8 Consequently, the court designated
the privilege as qualified rather than absolute. Absolute privileges
can be surmounted only by establishing the holder's waiver of the
privilege or the applicability of a special exception; 9 the party seek-
ing the allegedly privileged information cannot defeat the privilege
merely by showing a compelling need for the information.2' In con-
trast, a qualified or conditional privilege can be overridden by a
showing of need for the information.2 The court announced that the
trial judge should determine "whether, in the interests of justice, the
evidentiary need for the disclosure of the contents of the patient's
counseling sessions outweigh that patient's privacy interests."'
On the facts of the instant case, the court sustained the defen-
dants' privilege claim.' On the one hand, the court perceived little
need to override the privilege as the lower court record indicated that
14. Id
15. Imwinkelried, supra note 12, at 543.
16. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1356.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 1357.
19. See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN
AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 681 (4th ed. 1997).
20. See Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1493-94 (9th
Cir. 1989) (stating that there is no necessity exception to the attorney-client privilege
when the information sought is not otherwise discoverable).
21. See CARLSON ET AL., supra note 19, at 681.
22. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357.
23. See L at 1358.
there Were "numerous eyewitnesses" to the incident.24 On the other
hand, the court recognized that Redmond had a "substantial" interest
in protecting the confidentiality of the counseling sessions, since the
incident was traumatic in nature.25
B. The Supreme Court Decision
Just as the defendants had appealed the district court decision,
the plaintiffs prosecuted an appeal from the Seventh Circuit decision.
On appeal, over a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision to sustain the defen-
dants' privilege claim.26 The majority's opinion, however, differed in
three significant respects from the Seventh Circuit's reasoning.
To begin with, the majority eschewed the Seventh Circuit's hu-
manistic rationale and relied exclusively on instrumental reasoning.
The majority stated that the topics of consultations are so sensitive
that "the mere possibility of disclosure may impede the development
of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.- 27
In effect, the majority asserted that without the benefit of a privilege,
patients would be unwilling to make these types of revelations to psy-
chotherapists. To support this assertion, the Court, in a footnote, re-
ferred to "studies and authorities" cited in the American Psychiatric
Association's and the American Psychological Association's amicus
briefs. 28
Next, positing that the absence of a privilege would be a signifi-
cant disincentive for patients to make revelations to psychotherapists,
the majority professed that there was little rivalry between the pur-
suit of truth and the promotion of the policies underlying the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. The Court explained:
the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial of a
privilege is modest. If the privilege were rejected, confidential con-
versations between psychotherapists and their patients would surely
be chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the circumstances
that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in litiga-
tion. Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which
litigants such as [plaintiff] seek access-for example, admissions
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1.
27. See id. at 10.
28. See id. at 10 n.9.
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against interest by a party-is unlikely to come into being. This un-
spoken "evidence" would therefore serve no greater truth-seeking
function than if it had been spoken and privileged.29
If the patient ordinarily would not utter the statement without
the protection of a privilege, in most cases the enforcement of a
privilege would not result in the suppression of evidence; the state-
ment would not be made but for the existence of the privilege. Thus,
starting from its instrumental premise, the majority concluded that
the recognition of a privilege would be relatively cost-free."
Finally, based on its assumption that the creation of the privilege
would be essentially cost-free, the majority fashioned an absolute
privilege.3 The majority stated:
We part company with the Court of Appeals on ... the balancing
component of the privilege implemented by that court .... Making
the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later
evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in
privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate
the effectiveness of the privilege.... [I]f the purpose of the privi-
lege is to be served, the participants in the confidential conversa-
tion "must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privi-
lege.., is little better than no privilege at all. 32
The three differences between the Seventh Circuit's and Su-
preme Court's decisions are closely related. If we accept the instru-
mental premise that most patients would not divulge their informa-
tion without the assurance of a privilege, there is little rivalry
between the recognition of the privilege and the pursuit of truth; in
the typical case, the invocation of a privilege will not lead to the sup-
pression of evidence that would otherwise be available to the judicial
system. On that assumption, it makes sense to fashion an absolute
privilege. In order to effectuate the instrumental rationale, patients
must be able to predict with confidence that their revelations will re-
main confidential; therefore, the privilege rules should be formulated
as bright line standards, and there should be few, if any, exceptions to
the scope of the privilege. The creation of even an absolute privilege
comes with little cost, and its absolute character seems essential to
29. IM. at 11-12.
30. See id. at 12.
31. See id at 17-18.
32. Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (footnotes
omitted)).
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securing the instrumental objective.
The majority's reasoning in Jaffee seems plausible. However, as
we have learned in the evaluation of scientific testimony, it can be a
grave mistake to facilely equate the plausible and the proven.3 The
thesis of this Article is that as plausible as it appears, the majority's
instrumental rationale is flawed. Part II of this Article reviews the
empirical studies referenced in footnote 9 of the majority's opinion.
That Section concludes that those studies do not support the major-
ity's generalization that patients will not make the necessary revela-
tions to psychotherapists without the protection of an evidentiary
privilege. Part III explores the implications of the weakness of the
majority's instrumental rational.
H. The Weakness of the Majority's Instrumental Argument
That There is No Rivalry Between the Pursuit of Truth and the
Promotion of the Policies Inspiring a Psychotherapist Privilege
As we have seen, the linchpin of the Jaffee majority's reasoning
is its assumption that without the assurance of an evidentiary privi-
lege, the typical patient would be unwilling to make the sorts of dis-
closures that are essential in effective psychotherapy. The majority
evidently realized that the truth of this assumption is not self-evident.
Consequently, in footnote 9, the majority pointed to "studies and
authorities"34 cited in the amicus briefs filed by the American Psy-
chological and Psychiatric Associations to allegedly substantiate its
assumption. On closer scrutiny, however, the substantiation is illu-
sory.
A. The American Psychiatric Association Brief
A careful reading of the American Psychiatric Association's
amicus brief demonstrates that the Court in footnote 9 advisedly re-
ferred to it as citing "authorities" as well as "studies." That amicus
brief does not cite any empirical studies of patients' perceived need
for confidentiality in psychotherapy. The citations consist exclusively
of writings by mental health experts who simply pronounce that con-
33. See Golod v. Hoffman La Roche, 964 F. Supp. 841, 860-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating that although the expert's theory was "biologically plausible" it had not been
"tested by clinical trials, in animal studies, or otherwise").
34. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 n.9.
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fidentiality is necessary for effective treatment." The writings assert,
inter alia, that there is "general agreement among all writers" that
psychotherapy requires protection against disclosures and that
"[t]here is no disagreement" among such writers on this issue.36
Without any empirical support, the amicus brief gratuitously adds
that these assertions reflect "wide experience" in the mental health
profession.37
These citations are hardly persuasive. Even if we were to treat
the writings collectively as a representative sample of the attitudes of
psychotherapists, psychotherapists are not the relevant universe to
study. As some of the cited writings themselves acknowledge, the
key question is how the recognition of a testimonial privilege impacts
the state of mind of the patient.8 Thus, potential and actual patients
constitute the pertinent universe to sample. When it is feasible, as it
clearly is here, to sample the correct universe, it is inexcusable to rely
on another. The reliance on these authorities is especially suspect,
since mental health experts have a distinct bias on the question of the
need for a privilege. They have waged a long, intense campaign to
persuade both Congress and state legislatures to confer a privilege on
their profession.39 It hardly seems wise to rely on ipse dixit assertions
by members of the profession.
B. The American Psychological Association Brief
We turn now to the amicus brief filed by the American Psycho-
logical Association.' Admittedly, this brief makes a stronger case for
substantiating the majority's assumption. However, in the final
analysis, even this case is unconvincing.
Surveys of therapists rather than patients.
35. See Brief of the American Psychiatric Association and the Academy of Psychia-
try and the Law as Amici Curiae at 14-15, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No. 95-
266).
36. Id. at 15.
37. It. at 16.
38. See icL at 15 (quoting Ciccone, Privilege and Confidentiality: Psychiatric and Le-
gal Considerations, 2 PSYCHIATRIC MED. 273 (1985) ("a significant cornerstone to this
[therapeutic] alliance is the patient's expectation that the psychiatrist will keep secret
what is learned about the patient")).
39. See generally 25 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5522 (2d ed. 1989).
40. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychological Association, Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No. 95-266) [hereinafter cited as American Psychological
Association Brief].
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To begin with, some of the authorities cited in this brief suffer
from the same weakness as the citations in the American Psychiatric
Association's amicus brief. For example, the final study cited on the
bottom of page 14 of the American Psychological Association's brief
turns out to be a survey of therapists rather than therapists' pa-
tients.4 Likewise, a study referenced on page 15 canvassed therapists
rather than patients.42
Surveys posing the wrong question.
To be sure, the American Psychological Association brief does
mention some surveys of prospective and actual patients; however,
several of the surveys have little relevance to the question at issue in
Jaffee. The very first study cited in the brief is a 1986 article authored
by David Miller and Mark Thelen.43 It is true that this study investi-
gated patients' attitudes on the subject of "confidentiality." The
phrasing of the survey questions, however, did not make it clear to
the patients that they were being asked about their attitudes toward
court-authorized disclosure. The questions inquired about the pa-
tients' reaction to revelations to "police," "friends," "family," and
"authorities."44 The revelations to the first three categories specified
would presumably have been out of court. Hence, the patients re-
sponding might well have believed that the disclosure to authorities
would likewise occur without judicial supervision and screening.
Surveys yielding unimpressive findings.
Finally, even if accepted at face value, the findings of the cited
studies are unimpressive, despite the American Psychological Asso-
ciation's claims to the contrary. The amicus brief's treatment of the
Miller-Thelen study is illustrative. The brief cites to one favorable
passage in the study.45 The brief fails to note the article's acknowl-
edgment of the body of research indicating that the "level of confi-
dentiality has little effect on client behavior."46
41. See id. at 14 (citing Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psycho-
therapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 183 (1978)).
42. See id. at 15 (citing Note, supra note 41, at 177 n.67).
43. See American Psychological Association Brief, supra note 40, at 14 (citing David
Miller & Mark Thelen, Knowledge and Beliefs About Confidentiality in Psychotherapy, 17
J. PROF. PSYCHOL., RES. AND PRACT. 15 (1986)).
44. See Miller & Thelen, supra note 43, at 17.
45. See American Psychological Association Brief, supra note 40, at 14 (stating that
Miller and Thelen noted that "the majority of clients view confidentiality 'as an all-
encompassing, subordinate mandate for the profession of psychology"' (citing Miller &
Thelen, supra note 43, at 18).
46. Miller & Thelen, supra note 43, at 15.
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In the same paragraph, the amicus brief mentions a 1983 study
conducted by a group of researchers led by Donald Schmid.47 The
brief asserts that in this study, the researchers discovered that "sixty-
seven percent of patients would be upset or angry if their confidences
were revealed without permission.""a What the brief does not make
clear is that the finding in question relates to extra-judicial disclosure.
The more pertinent finding is that the response varied with the iden-
tity of the recipient of the data; more specifically, only 33% of the re-
spondents would have been upset by release of information to a
court.4 9 The respondents were much more concerned about out-of-
court disclosures to persons such as employers." In the same study,
only 17% of the respondents indicated that an unauthorized disclo-
sure of confidential information about them would prompt them to
cease treatment.51
Still in the same paragraph, the amicus brief cites a 1984 article
by Applebaum, Kapen, Walters, Lidz, and Roth. 2 Once again, the
brief seizes on a passage in the study which lends some support to the
American Psychological Association's position. 3 However, on the
whole, the findings reached in the study undercut that position.
The 1984 article begins with a survey of the literature which the
authors characterize as "quite limited. 5 4 The survey canvasses four
studies. The survey begins with a discussion of a study which con-
cluded that prospective patients do "not [even] consider the issue of
confidentiality unless specifically warned that it might be absent."55
The survey then turns to another study which inquired about pa-
tients' reaction to an unauthorized release of information to state
47. See American Psychological Association Brief, supra note 40, at 14 (citing Don-
ald Schmid et al., Confidentiality in Psychiatry: A Study of the Patient's View, 34 HOsP.
AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 353,354 (Apr. 1983)).
48. American Psychological Association Brief, supra note 40, at 14.
49. See Schmid et al., supra note 47, at 353.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See American Psychological Association Brief, supra note 40, at 14 (citing Paul S.
Appelbaum et al., Confidentiality: An Empirical Test of the Utilitarian Perspective, 12
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY& L. 109 (1984)).
53. See id. (citing Appelbaum et. al., supra note 52, at 114, as finding that "fifty-
seven percent of patients said therapists' revelations of information without their permis-
sion would adversely affect the therapeutic relationship").
54. Appelbaum et al., supra note 52, at 110.
55. Id. (citing Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Em-
pirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REv. 893 (1982)).
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agencies. 6 That study found that "patients would not be deterred
from seeking care by a threat (admittedly mild) to confidentiality.' 57
The survey next describes a third study conducted in New Jersey. In
that survey, only 22% "of the sample reported that they had held
back from seeking psychotherapy because of a fear of disclosure."58
The survey then considers a fourth study in which the researchers
discovered that only 8% of the responding patients "would have"
sought "treatment earlier" if they had known of a law prohibiting dis-
closure.59
The 1984 study then documents the results of the authors' own
investigation. In their study, the researchers questioned inpatients as
well as outpatients.' In both groups, only a minority of respondents
stated that they would have any "[n]egative [r]eaction[]" to a thera-
pist's unauthorized disclosure of confidential information to
"courts."61 As in the 1983 study, the respondents indicated that they
were much more concerned about out-of-court disclosure to employ-
ers.6' Summarizing their independent research, the authors con-
cluded that "the outpatients we interviewed did not appear con-
cerned about absolute confidentiality."63 Their data led the authors
to conclude that patients would "seek and participate in psychiatric
treatment even in [the] absence" of confidentiality in the form of an
evidentiary privilege.'
Later on the same page, the amicus brief points to a multi-stage
Canadian-American study conducted in the mid-1980s by a group of
researchers led by Daniel W. Shuman.65 The pattern is familiar. The
brief highlights a few isolated passages in the study which appear to
strengthen the brief's argument.66 However, those selected passages
56. See id. at 111 (citing C.E. Rosen, Why Clients Relinquish Their Rights to Privacy
under Sign-Away Pressure, 8 PROF. PSYCHOL. 17 (1977)).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing J.J. Lindenthal & C. S. Thomas, Psychiatrists, the Public and Confi-
dentiality, 4 J. NERV. MENT. Dis. 353 (1963)).
59. Id. (citing Shuman & Weiner, supra note 55).
60. See id. at 113.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 115.
64. Id. at 114.
65. See American Psychological Association Brief, supra note 40, at 14 (citing Daniel
W. Shuman et al., The Privilege Study (Part III): Psychotherapist-Patient Communications
in Canada, 9 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY, 393 (1986); Shuman & Weiner, supra note 55).
66. See id. (citing the study as showing "that when clients are told that their therapist
might be required to disclose their communications in court, their willingness to discuss
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paint a misleading picture of the study's overall findings.
Consider, for instance, some of the other significant findings
from the Canadian phase of the study. "Only seventeen percent" of
the respondents replied that they "rely most strongly on privilege"
law in deciding whether to make disclosures to their therapists; in
contrast, the vast majority indicated that they relied on their thera-
pist's own professional ethics.67 In this phase of the study, the re-
searchers found no "statistically significant difference" between the
attitudes of patients in provinces without a privilege and those resid-
ing in provinces recognizing a privilege.6" In Quebec province, which
recognizes a privilege, only 7% of the participating patients stated
that they "would have sought treatment earlier had they known of a
privilege.
69
The findings in the American phase of the study point in the
same direction. In Texas, only 8% of the respondents reported that
the existence of an evidentiary privilege would have prompted them
to seek treatment earlier.7' In South Carolina and West Virginia, the
corresponding statistic was only 11%."' As in the Canadian study,
86% of the respondents indicated that they were relying on the
therapist's professional ethics-"not privilege" law-to protect their
privacy.' Although some American patients reported withholding
information from therapists, "[t]his withholding seemed unrelated to
the presence or absence of [an evidentiary] privilege, and most of
these patients indicated that a privilege would not have resulted in
fuller disclosure." 73
Summarizing the data in both phases of their study, the re-
searchers conclude "that the evidence for the proposition that a psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege is necessary for effective psychother-
apy is highly questionable."'74 In the study, "[m]ost... patients
indicated that a privilege would not have resulted in fuller disclosure"
on their part.75 The bottom line in this study is the finding that "peo-
sensitive topics declines markedly" (citing Shuman et al., supra note 65, at 919-20, 926,
929 Appendix Table I)).
67. See Shuman et al., supra note 65, at 407.
68. I at 411.
69. lId at 410.
70. See id at 413.
71. See id. at 414.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 416.
74. Id. at 417.
75. Id. at 416.
pie do not look to [evidence] law for guidance in their decision to en-
ter into therapy or make disclosures in therapy." 6
The unimpressive nature of the findings in these studies is com-
pounded because the historical experience tends to undercut the in-
strumental rationale for a psychotherapist privilege. Assume argu-
endo that a majority of the prospective and actual patients said that
they would not divulge secrets to a therapist without the assurance of
an evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the history of psychotherapy
should give courts pause before accepting the instrumental rationale.
In his dissent in Jaffee, Justice Scalia asks rhetorically: "If that is
so,"-if the majority's instrumental rationale is valid-"how come
psychotherapy got to be a thriving practice before the 'psychothera-
pist privilege' was invented?" 7 On this issue, history is on Justice
Scalia's side. Psychotherapy in fact emerged before any jurisdiction
conferred an evidentiary privilege on the profession. Shuman,
Weiner, and Pinard point out that the profession seemingly flourishes
in many jurisdictions which do not recognize any privilege.79
C. Summary
On balance, the research data collected in the studies cited in the
Jaffee amicus briefs lead to the conclusion that, in embracing the in-
strumental rationale for a psychotherapist privilege, the Jaffee ma-
jority overestimated the impact of the existence of a privilege on the
behavior of the typical patient. As Justice Scalia observed, the ques-
tion is whether "most, or even many, of those who seek psychological
counseling have the worry of litigation in the back of their minds."8"
The available studies do not substantiate the empirical claim that the
typical patient is so concerned about the prospect of litigation that
the availability of an evidentiary privilege will significantly affect his
or her willingness to seek treatment or make necessary revelations to
a therapist."1 In his dissent, Justice Scalia professes that he is skepti-
cal that "a person will be deterred from seeking psychological coun-
seling, or from being completely truthful in the course of such coun-
76. Id. at 418.
77. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 39, § 5522, at 103.
79. See Shuman et al., supra note 65, at 395.
80. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 39, § 5522, at 91, 101.
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seling, because of fear of later disclosure in litigation." 2 Rather than
bolstering the majority's argument, the studies referenced in the ma-
jority's footnote demonstrate that Justice Scalia's skepticism is war-
ranted. Even if we accept the most favorable findings in those studies
at face value, they do not support the hypothesis that, in the typical
case, the patient would be deterred by the absence of an evidentiary
privilege.
It is perhaps understandable that the majority would be so will-
ing to subscribe to the instrumental rationale. After all, the courts'
business is litigation. On a daily, often hourly, basis, judges typically
focus on litigation. Given that mind-set, judges are likely to find the
instrumental rationale particularly plausible; since they devote so
much of their professional thought to aspects of litigation, they would
naturally be inclined to believe that other persons share their con-
cern. Again the plausible, however, does not equate with the
proven.3
It would be a mistake to overstate the definitiveness of the avail-
able empirical data; the data does not conclusively disprove the ma-
jority's behavioral assumption. The studies are few in number.8 4 As
recently as 1983, there were evidently no relevant empirical investiga-
tions."5 Moreover, the databases in many of the studies are quite
small; in one leading study, the database consisted of a mere thirty
inpatients. 6 It is therefore impossible to generalize with complete
confidence. 7 Further research is unquestionably necessary.8 How-
ever, if the question is whether the available studies prove the as-
sumption underlying the Jaffee majority's instrumental rationale, the
answer must be no.
The upshot of this analysis is that the operative assumption
should be that there is a genuine rivalry between the pursuit of truth
and the promotion of the policies underlying the psychotherapist
privilege. The available studies do not sustain the conclusion that in
all or even most cases, the proffered statement would not have been
82. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. See Golod v. Hoffinan La Roche, 964 F. Supp. at 860-61.
84. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 52, at 110 ("The empirical data relevant to the
proposition are quite limited"); Miller & Thelen, supra note 35, at 15 (noting that there is
only "a small amount of research"); Schmid, supra note 47, at 353 (noting that there is
only limited empirical data).
85. See Schmid et al., supra note 47, at 353.
86. See id. at 353.
87. See Miller & Thelen, supra note 43, at 18.
88. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 52, at 116.
made but for the existence of the privilege. The studies do not justify
Justice Stevens' confidence that "[w]ithout a privilege, much of the
desirable evidence to which litigants ... seek access ... is unlikely to
come into being."89 Quite to the contrary, although the studies are
not conclusive,' they point to the conclusion that in the typical case,
the invocation of the privilege suppresses evidence which would have
come into existence even if the privilege did not exist. Thus, the rec-
ognition of the privilege does not come relatively cost free, as Justice
Stevens would have us believe.
111. The Implications of the Weakness of the Majority's
Instrumental Argument
A. The Unsoundness of Relying on the Instrumental Rationale as a
Justification for Recognizing a Psychotherapy Privilege
A careful review of the studies cited by the majority leads not
only to the conclusion that the recognition of a privilege comes at a
cost, the findings in those studies also carry the implication that the
cost is excessive. If the only stated justification for the privilege were
the instrumental rationale upon which the Jaffee majority relied, the
Court arguably should have rejected the defendants' privilege claim.
The findings in the available studies make Wigmore's classic remark
apropos: The "benefits" of the privilege "are... speculative; its ob-
struction is plain and concrete."'"
The studies uniformly indicate that the availability of a privilege
has little or no influence on the typical patient's decisions to seek
therapy and to make disclosures to a therapist. Thus, in the run-of-
the-mill case,92 it does not serve the privilege's instrumental rationale
to exclude the statement; contrary to Justice Stevens' assertion, the
evidence would have "come into being" even if there had been no
privilege.93
89. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996).
90. One question is the relation between the universe of patients' statements and
subset of statements proffered at trial. Is the subset sample representative of the uni-
verse? To date, there have been no empirical investigations of that question.
91. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
92. See supra note 90.
93. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12.
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However, in that same typical case, the enforcement of the
privilege will tend to frustrate the search for truth. If the statement is
being proffered at trial and the objection is on privilege-rather than
relevance-grounds, the statement is presumably probative under
Federal Rule of Evidence 401.' Consequently, to use Justice Stev-
ens' expression, the admission of the statement would further the
court's "truth-seeking function."'95 In short, in the typical case the
trier of fact will be denied helpful testimony even though the exclu-
sion of the evidence does not effectuate the Court's articulated in-
strumental rationale.
In framing a general legal rule of presumptive applicability such
as an evidentiary privilege, the Court should take into account the
balance of policy considerations in the typical case. If that is the case,
the norm ought to be that there is no psychotherapist privilege. As
one group of researchers frankly conceded, "if patients place little
value" on evidentiary privilege, "it may well be that other social
goals-for example, ascertaining facts in the pursuit of justice ... -
deserve priority."96
B. The Need to Develop a Non-Instrumental Rationale for Recognizing a
Psychotherapy Privilege
If the majority's instrumental rationale is flawed, two choices
remain: either reject the psychotherapist privilege or develop an al-
ternative, non-instrumental rationale for recognizing the privilege.
As previously stated, in its opinion in Jaffee, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit relied on non-instrumental as well as instrumen-
tal rationalesY In an Article as short as this one, it would be pre-
sumptuous to attempt to develop a definitive humanistic rationale for
a psychotherapist privilege. However, it is possible to sketch98 the
contours of that rationale and indicate why the psychotherapist
privilege is an especially attractive candidate for such a rationale.
In the past, there have been efforts to construct a humanistic,
non-instrumental rationale for privilege doctrine. The efforts have
94. FED. R. EVID. 401.
95. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12.
96. Schmid et al., supra note 47, at 353-54.
97. See Jaffee, 51 F.3d 1346.
98. The author is in the process of revising the privilege volume of the Wigmore
Evidence treatise. The author intends to develop this topic in greater depth in the revised
volume.
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endeavored to justify evidentiary privileges on such grounds as the
protection of privacy. Highly respected commentators including Pro-
fessor Louisel99 and Dean Krattenmaker'" have proposed grounding
privilege doctrine on the value of privacy.
At first blush, that proposal seems promising. Many of the rele-
vant mental health professions have adopted ethical codes, requiring
practitioners to maintain the privacy of confidential information di-
vulged by patients. 1' Perhaps more importantly, in several respects
the judicial system has elevated that duty to legal status. A large
number of courts have invoked tort10 2 or constitutional' 3 law to en-
force the duty.
As promising as the proposal appears initially, however, standing
alone, privacy cannot serve as the ultimate basis for formulating
privilege doctrine; it would be difficult to view privacy as the ulti-
mate, intrinsic good underlying privilege doctrine. To begin with, as
a right, privacy is of recent vintage. The advent of the privacy torts is
a modern legal phenomenon."° At the constitutional level, the rec-
ognition of privacy has an even shorter lineage. In civil constitutional
jurisprudence, it was not until 1965 in Griswold that the Court found
a generalized privacy right in the ninth amendment.0 5 In fourth
amendment jurisprudence, the advent was even later; not until 1967
in Katz did the Court declare that the amendment protects privacy,
not property. 1
06
Moreover, in principle, it is impossible to defend the proposition
that privacy is either an ultimate value or an inherent moral good.
Privacy is simply not an ultimate value in liberal democratic theory.
Nor is it an intrinsic moral good. It is true that persons seeking spiri-
tual counseling value the privacy of their consultations with religious
99. See David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in
Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956).
100. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Al-
ternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61 (1973).
101. See Schmid et al., supra note 47, at 353 (citing the codes of ethics for psychology.
social work, and nursing).
102. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 39 at § 5522, at 75 (stating "a cause of ac-
tion for extra-judicial breaches of confidentiality").
103. See id. at § 5572, at 527 (citing In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415 (1970): State v. Nel-
son, 61 Cr.L. (BNA) 1358 (Mont. June 24, 1997)).
104. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS Ch. 20 (5th ed. 1984).
105. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
106. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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functionaries such as priests.'07 However, it is equally true that
criminal conspirators value privacy. Revolutionaries planning the
violent overthrow of the state are especially jealous of the privacy of
their discussions.
Thus, if we are going to construct a deontological '°s case for evi-
dentiary privileges, privileges must be linked to an ultimate value or
primary good"w other than privacy.
Autonomy is the most obvious candidate. It is conceived as an
ultimate value in a liberal democratic system such as ours.1 0 In a plu-
ralist society, the person has a substantial degree of autonomy to de-
termine the content of his or her own life plan."' In a liberal demo-
cratic society, the individual citizen is a chooser,112 and he or she has
the right to select the preferences which define his or her life plan.'
The question is whether privacy and privilege can be linked to
autonomy. The existence of a link is hardly self-evident; indeed, the
link is arguably counter-intuitive. Autonomy is often viewed as the
right to decide and act independently; it seems to assume an atomistic
individual in solitude or isolation.' However, relational privacy as-
sumes an individual situated in a community.'
Yet, on closer scrutiny, there is a link. There is a strong argu-
ment that in certain contexts in modem society, privacy is essential to
the effective exercise of autonomy. More specifically, privacy pro-
motes autonomy by facilitating intelligent, independent life prefer-
ence choices.
As previously stated, autonomy is the right to make choices as to
certain preferences. 6 However, the autonomy in question is not the
autonomy of a self-sufficient" 7 hermit or recluse isolated from soci-
107. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2, at 286-87 (4th ed. 1992).
108. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 52, at 109.
109. See CHANDRAN KUKATHAS & PHILLIP PETrIT, RAWLS: A THEORY OF JUSTICE
AND rrs CRITICS 25,55 (1990).
110. See BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 57 (1994).
111. See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 4, 18
(1988).
112. See id. at 18,65; see also RONALD BEINER, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH
LIBERALISM 32 (1992); CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 112-13 (1970).
113. See DWORKIN, supra note 111, at 4, 18,26,31,65.
114. See BEINER, supra note 112, at 17,23.
115. See iL at29.
116. See DWORKIN, supra note 111, at 4, 18,26, 31, 65.
117. Seeid. at23.
ety; again, it is the autonomy of a social being'18 situated in a society.
In some contexts, the individual citizen cannot make an intelligent,
autonomous choice unless he or she is guaranteed the opportunity to
consult third parties.'19 If the person's life plan collides with that of
another citizen, the person may need to resort to the litigation system
to pursue his or her plan. The litigation system gives the individual
the right to make choices as to the assertion or waiver of substantive
and procedural rights.120 However, the individual lacks the expertise
to fully appreciate the consequences of the choices; thus, as the Su-
preme Court itself has remarked, the individual needs "the guiding
hand of counsel"' 2' to make those choices in a reflective manner.
Likewise, irrespective of the content of the person's life plan, he or
she needs to maintain physical and mental health in order to effec-
tively pursue the plan. Our medical care system affords the individ-
ual a wide range of choices, 22 but as in the case of the legal system.
the individual lacks the expertise to understand the full range of
choice.1 23 Again, the individual has a substantial range of choice in
structuring his or her personal and family life.1 24 However, a rational
individual 125 will want to know the preferences of the other persons
directly affected by those choices. 126 Before making a decision that
could dramatically affect his or her family, any rational spouse would
want to know the relevant aspects of the life plan of the other spouse.
In all these settings, a right to consult another person is a condition
for the effective exercise of the citizen's autonomy.
12 7
Thus, consultation enhances the person's opportunity to make
an intelligent choice. The dilemma is that the same consultation im-
perils another aspect of truly autonomous choice-namely, its inde-
pendence. The consultation gives the consultant the opportunity to
exercise coercion and manipulation and consequently could under-
118. See FRIED, supra note 112, at 105.
119. See DWORKIN, supra note 111, at 12, 56.
120. See STEPHEN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE
AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 27-29 (1988).
121. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
122. See DWORKIN, supra note 111, at 101-04.
123. See id. at 113.
124. See KUKATHAS & PETTIT, supra note 109, at 20, 43.
125. See DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 64 (1996).
126. See DWORKIN, supra note 111. at 23.
127. See id. at 104.
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mine the independence of the choice."H The threat is a real one,
given the nature of the information conveyed to the consultant and
the character of the relation between the person and the consultant.
When the consultant is an expert, the nature of the consultant's ad-
vice makes it difficult for the person to second-guess the advice be-
cause the person lacks the expertise to formulate the advice in the
first instance. Moreover, these are not arm's length relationships be-
tween strangers. The person is consulting either a fellow family
member or an expert who avows that he or she is committed to
helping the person pursue the person's interests. The nature of the
relationship is likely to incline the person to accept the consultant's
advice and statements at face value. That inclination makes the per-
son especially vulnerable to coercion and manipulation.
At this point, Joseph Raz' positive theory of freedom is highly
pertinent." A liberal democratic society should not only intervene
to protect autonomy when the violation of a person's autonomy is
certain or probable. More broadly, society should act to create con-
ditions conducive to autonomy13 -in this setting, conditions that
conduce to truly autonomous life preference choice. In particular,
society should create conditions which give the person good reason to
trust that the consultant will make a bona fide effort to assist the per-
son to make an intelligent, independent choice.
Charles Fried has argued that in general, privacy is the moral
capital of trust. 3 As he has written, trust requires an intimacy based
on "the sharing of information about one's actions, beliefs or emo-
tions which one does not share with all.. 132 In short, privacy is the
currency of trust.' The basis of mutual trust is one citizen's willing-
ness to surrender privacy by sharing information about himself or
herself and another citizen's responsive willingness to maintain the
privacy of the shared information as against third parties. Hence, the
maintenance of privacy is "essential" to the creation of trusting rela-
tionships.'34
More specifically, the creation of a private, intimate enclave for
the person and the consultant will enhance the person's ability to
128. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 373, 377-78 (1986).
129. See id. at 408-10.
130. See id.
131. See FRIED, supra note 112, at 81.




make intelligent, independent life preference choices. In such an en-
clave, the person will be free to disclose to the consultant all informa-
tion relevant to the person's life preferences. That disclosure will en-
able the consultant to give the person more informed advice and,
hence, increase the probability that the person will make an intelli-
gent choice. Moreover, in the enclave, the consultant will be free to
advise the person without concern about the potentially conflicting
preferences of third parties. That freedom will reduce the risk of
manipulation and thereby increase the probability that the person's
ultimate choice will be an independent one. In this line of argument,
the creation of an evidentiary privilege is conceived as a means of
creating the necessary enclave.
It is important to note several features of this line of argument.
To begin with, this argument is not instrumental in the same sense as
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Jaffee. The linchpin of this line of
argument is the positive theory of freedom. The theory is a norma-
tive proposition rather than an empirical hypothesis. As such, the
theory is tested by examining its consistency with liberal democratic
theory rather than by subjecting it to experimentation or scientific in-
vestigation. Further, this argument differs from the humanistic the-
ory advanced by the Seventh Circuit in Jaffee. That court identified
privacy as the ultimate value to be promoted by recognizing privi-
leges.'35 To be sure, privacy has a role to play here. However, in this
line, privacy is neither a primary right nor an ultimate value. At
most, privacy is a derivative right. More specifically, it is a condition
conducive to creating the intimate enclave which promotes truly
autonomous life preference choices-choices that are both intelligent
and independent.
The linkage between privacy and the primary good of autonomy
unquestionably requires more extended analysis. Unfortunately, to
date, there has been little discussion of the connection between
autonomy and privacy in the philosophic literature. 36 However, my
primary purpose today is simply to suggest that the exploration of
that connection may be the key to developing a new humanistic ra-
tionale for privilege doctrine.
Conclusion
In 1993, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Daubert
135. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995). affd, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
136. See DWORKIN, supra note 111, at 161.
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v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.137 There the Supreme Court
addressed the standard for determining the admissibility of purport-
edly scientific testimony. The Daubert Court correctly perceived that
the validity of one type of claim-a scientific hypothesis-turns on
the extent of the empirical validation of the claim. 3' Given Daubert,
the Jaffee Court's failure to more closely scrutinize the empirical as-
sumptions underlying defendants' privilege claim is particularly dis-
appointing. The studies relied upon by the majority fall far short of
substantiating the instrumental rationale the majority advanced. The
Jaffee Court should either have rejected the privilege claim or under-
taken to develop an alternative rationale for recognizing the privi-
lege.
The importance of the Jaffee decision transcends the psycho-
therapy privilege. The conventional wisdom is that the traditional in-
strumental rationale for privilege doctrine is strongest in this setting.
If the rationale fails here-as it appears to-the failure calls into
question the propriety of relying on the rationale in many other set-
tings, including the broader medical privilege,139 the spousal privi-
lege,' 4° the corporate attorney-client privilege, 4' and the clergy
privilege. 142
For the past few decades, an "abolitionist wave" has been domi-
nant in Anglo-American evidence law. 43 There has been a marked
general trend toward the relaxation of evidentiary admissibility stan-
dards. Privilege doctrine has been the only doctrinal area which has
largely resisted the trend.1" The durability of privilege doctrine may
reflect a perceived need for privacy in modern liberal democratic so-
ciety.
Nevertheless, the future of privilege law is hardly secure. As we
move farther into the post-Daubert era, judges and lawyers will be-
137. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
138. See generally Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A
New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715 (1994).
139. See I MCCORMICK, supra note 107, at 98.
140. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN
EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE § 5.34, at 610 (1995) (describing the position
taken by the Advisory Committee which drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence).
141. See 24 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5476, at 145, § 5483, at 310 (1986).
142. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 107, § 76.2.
143. See Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. JURISPRUDENCE.
279 (1996).
144. See id. at 282.
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come more adept at identifying essentially empirical issues and more
readily recognize when the proffered validation falls short. Many of
the assertions made by the Jaffee majority are empirical claims, and
the authorities arrayed in the amicus briefs cited in the majority's
footnotes fall far short of substantiating those claims. Unless we un-
dertake the difficult task of constructing an alternative, humanistic
rationale for privileges, privilege doctrine, like junk science, may
soon fall into disrepute.
